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Abstract
An agent decides against her preferences, if she considers
an option x better than another option y but neverthe-
less decides to do y. A central tenet of rational choi-
ce theory states that individuals do not decide against
their preferences, whereby we find two kinds of potential
counterexamples in the literature: akrasia, also known as
weak-willed decisions, and decisions based on so-called
deontic constraints such as obligations or commitments.
While there is some empirical evidence that weak-willed
choices are a real phenomenon, leading scholars in phi-
losophy of economics debate whether choices based on
commitments can be counter-preferential. As far as we
know, however, nobody so far has tried to settle this de-
bate empirically. This paper contributes to both debates
since we present some empirical evidence that (i) akrasia
can also be strong-willed and (ii) choices made on the ba-
sis of commitments can indeed be counter-preferential.
We will conclude that people can decide against their
preferences without being unreasonable.
Keywords: Counter-Preferential Choice; Rational
Choice Theory; Akrasia; Commitments; Empirical Stu-
dies.
The Putative Irrationality of
Deciding against Preferences
A fundamental assumption of most theories of rational
choice is that an agent always chooses the option she con-
siders best.1 Violating this assumption is deemed irratio-
nal (Hausman 2012a). This basic tenet applies to both
maximizing and optimizing concepts of rational choice,
e.g., if one is a maximizer, one chooses the option that
one believes maximizes one’s utility. The option that is
considered best (or at least not worse than any other) is
the one the agent prefers.
What does it mean to prefer an option? Savage (1954)
takes the notion of preference “in an ordinary mathema-
tical usage by saying that the relation is a simple orde-
ring among acts” (Savage 1954, p. 18). In contrast, phi-
losophers often understand preferences as mental states,
e.g., Hausman states “to say that Jill prefers x to y is to
say that when Jill has thought about everything she ta-
kes to bear on how much she values x and y, Jill ranks x
above y” (Hausman 2012b, p. 34). Of course, Hausman’s
1 Some advocates of satisficing concepts of rational choice
would disagree. If one is a satisficer, one settles for any
alternative one considers satisfactory (Simon 1953; Slote
2004).
notion of preference as total subjective comparative eva-
luation is controversial. Angner (2018), for instance, ar-
gues that economists neither do use nor should use such
a conception of preference. However, note that Angner
himself accepts that Hausman develops a useful model
of preferences. For the purposes of our paper, Hausman’s
conception is specifically effective because it illustrates
why choosing a worse option doesn’t seem to make sen-
se. According to such an understanding, an agent follows
her preference ordering because she will then do what she
values the most, or in other words, what she believes is
best for her.
Saying that the agent chooses what she prefers to do
is not to say that the agent chooses what is always best
for her. In cases of uncertainty, an agent might choose
an option that does not maximize her utility since un-
expected states of the world might materialize. Agents
might also base their preference ranking on false beliefs.2
They might be mistaken about their preferences, or are
simply not able to form a preference ordering (Messer-
li & Reuter 2017). It seems also false to postulate that
agents always take into account all the available informa-
tion like utilities and probabilities of options (Kahneman
& Tversky 2000). Some of these aspects have been used
to criticize models of rational choice theory. Nonetheless,
these points of criticism do not apply to the fundamental
tenet that agents choose what they consider best.
So, are advocates of rational choice theory right that
counter-preferential choices do not exist? Or do agents
sometimes choose options they consider worse than ano-
ther, and hence violate this basic assumption of rational
choice theory?3
2 Paul (2014), for instance, argues that agents who con-
template so-called transformative choices cannot form
reasonable beliefs about the content of their experiences,
and, thus, cannot make a rational choice. For a critical
reply, see, e.g., Reuter & Messerli (2018).
3 One might object that the assumption that agents choo-
se what they consider best cannot be falsified. Revealed
preference theorists, for example, assume that decisions
reflect preferences. Consequently, there is no conceptual
gap between a person’s preferences and the actions she
decides to perform. However, on most philosophers’ in-
terpretation, expected utility represents the strength of
an agent’s preference for the outcome, where preferences
are understood as psychological states. Given this inter-
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As far as we know, there are at least two kinds of
potential counterexamples challenging this assumption.
First, decisions can be deontically constrained, a tech-
nical term used to refer to constraints that arise when
morality requires us to act in ways that are contrary
to self-interest (see, e.g., Heath 2008). Put differently, a
deontic constraint can be understood as a form of du-
ty or rule that makes people refrain from the pursuit of
individual advantage. That may sound fairly abstract,
but we all are familiar with situations in which we act
because we have given a promise, not because we ac-
tually prefer to act that way. We will come back to this
issue in the General Discussion when discussing whether
commitments can be counter-preferential.
Second, weak-willed decisions (or akratic decisions)
are also potential counterexamples violating the assump-
tion that agents choose what they consider best. To il-
lustrate akratic decisions, take the case of Lewd Larry:
Larry believes that staying in his room and staying faith-
ful to his girlfriend is better than having an affair with
his flatmate Jackie, but then finds himself trying to se-
duce her. Davidson (1970) defines weak-willed actions as
follows:4 In doing y an agent acts weak-willed if and only
if: (i) the agent does y intentionally; (ii) the agent belie-
ves there is an alternative action x open to him; (iii) the
agent judges that, all-things considered, it would be bet-
ter to do x than to do y. Lewd Larry seems to fulfill all
the requirements for being weak-willed. Weak-willed de-
cisions not only seem to violate a fundamental assumpti-
on of rational choice theory, the intuitive plausibility of
Lewd Larry demonstrates that weak-willed actions are
real. However, most scholars at least agree with advo-
cates of rational choice theory that such a decision is
irrational: he should not have decided to seduce Jackie,
given his belief it is not his best option.
In the rest of this paper, we do three things: First, we
describe a case illustrating a violation of the aforemen-
tioned fundamental assumption of rational choice theory,
which is not (at least not intuitively) an akratic decision,
and, we present a first experiment showing that these ca-
ses are real. Second, we discuss an objection against our
study and results, and we counter this objection using
a second study. Third, taking ideas from Amartya Sen,
we argue that we have good reasons to believe that such
decisions are reasonable choices. In other words, such
choices can be understood as acting out of commitment,
whereby the commitment is counter-preferential.
pretation of rational choice theory, the assumption that
agents actually choose options they consider worse than
another is empirically testable.
4 For discussions on the concept of akrasia as well as cri-
ticisms on Davidson’s definition, see, e.g., Mele (1991),
Holton (1999), and May & Holton (2012).
Experimental Study 1
Examples in which an agent decides against her prefe-
rences almost always seem to have the following pattern.
The agent values x more than y, and hence prefers x to
y, but “lower” desires triggered by lust or sloth, move the
agent to do y. It need not be the case, however, that an
agent decides against her preferences only if she is weak-
willed. An agent might value x more than y, and hence
prefers x to y, but is moved by his “higher” commitments
or obligations to do y. To illustrate such a case, take the
following example. Today, a colleague of yours has asked
you whether you would help him move some furniture,
and you agreed to be at his place the next morning. The
next morning, however, friends of yours ask you whether
you would like to join them for a beautiful day at the
lake. It seems at least possible that in such a situati-
on, you value going to the lake more than helping your
colleague move furniture. Nonetheless, you decide to be
at your colleague’s place and help him move furniture.
Note that similar to typical weak-willed decisions, you
might loathe the fact that you have acted contrary to
what you considered the best option. While such acti-
ons satisfy Davidson’s definition of being weak-willed, it
seems highly odd to call them weak-willed.5
The decision we described above violates the basic te-
net of rational choice theory just as much as weak-willed
decisions. The agent does not maximize her utility by
choosing an option she considers worse than an availa-
ble alternative. But are these decisions actually real? Or
are they mere figments of philosophers’ imaginations?
The following experiment strongly suggests that these
decisions are part of many people’s reality.
Methods
120 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical
Turk and paid a small fee for their participation. 5 parti-
cipants were excluded for not having completed the sur-
vey. The remaining 115 participants (51 women, Mage
= 39.09, SD = 15.69) all indicated that they were native
English speakers. All participants were randomly assi-
gned to one of three conditions, two test conditions (Ac-
quaintance, Colleague) and one control condition. The
5 Davidson discusses similar, so-called incontinent cases,
in which a person follows a duty or principle when doing
y intentionally (e.g., getting up and brushing her teeth),
although all-things considered, she judges x to be better
than y, e.g., it is more pleasurable to stay in bed. Howe-
ver, there is an important difference between our cases
and Davidson’s incontinent cases. In Davidson’s examp-
les, the agent does not believe she has very good reasons
to follow a certain duty or principle, e.g., the agent re-
asons that her teeth are very strong anyway. In our ex-
amples, the agent is likely to believe that she has good
reasons to keep a promise. In other words, the agent be-
lieves that helping a colleague move is the right thing to
do. This contrast explains why Davidson believes that in
incontinent cases an agent cannot understand herself and
that she recognizes something absurd in her intentional
behavior, while this would not be true in our case.
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vignettes of the two test conditions read as follows:
Test condition Imagine that an acquaintance (a col-
league) of yours asks you whether you would help him
move some furniture and household appliances into his
new apartment. You agree to be at his place at 10am
the next day. The next morning, it is a beautiful warm
summer day. At 8am you get a call from friends who ask
you whether you would like to join them for a nice day
at a lake. All things considered and independent of how
you decide in the end, how do you value each of the two
options:
• Spending the day at the lake and tell my acquaintance
(colleague) that I cannot come.
• Moving furniture and household appliances and tell my
friends that I cannot join them.6
The vignette for the control condition read:
Control condition Imagine that you plan your year-
ly holidays. On the one hand, you could go to the sea-
side and spend a week relaxing at the beach. On the
other hand, you could book a trip to a city you have not
seen before and experience some cultural highlights. All
things considered and independent of how you decide in
the end, how do you value each of the two options:
• Spending the holidays on the beach and not going to a city.
• Spending the holidays in a city and not going to the beach.
After the participants rated both options, they were
then directed to the second question reading:
Decision Question You have just valued each of the
two options. But how do you decide in the end? Please
tell us what you will do:
For the two test conditions, the participants were pre-
sented with two options: (1) I choose to go to the lake
and tell my acquaintance (colleague) I cannot come. (2)
I choose to move furniture and household appliances and
6 Both options were presented in randomized order and
participants were asked to rate the value of each option
on an 11-point Likert scale anchored at 0 meaning “Not
at all valuable” and 10 meaning “Extremely valuable”.
Which concept of utility is relevant here? Importantly,
we do not understand utility as a more precise ranking
than an ordinal one (e.g. cardinal measure or ratio scale).
The strength of a value judgement can be understood
in purely ordinal terms, respectively, the experiment is
perfectly consistent with an ordinal interpretation. If a
participant evaluates two options within this scale, e.g.
a = 9 and b = 3, this simply means that he or she ranks
a above b. In other words, the only information these
numbers provide is that an agent prefers a to b without
saying how much he or she values a more than b.
Figure 1 Responses in % to the two test conditions and the control
condition. Dark grey depicts the percentage of participants who
would decide in line with their preferences. Light grey represents the
percentage of participants who would decide against their preferences.
A few participants (medium grey) indicated an equal preference for
both options.
tell my friends I cannot join them. In the control condi-
tion, the options were: (1) I choose to go to the seaside
and spend a week relaxing at the beach. (2) I choose
to go to a city and experience some cultural highlights.
Participants had to choose which decision they would
take.
Results
The results of people’s responses are summarized in Fi-
gure 1 above. In both the Acquaintance as well as the
Colleague condition, around 31% of the participants who
decided in favor of helping to move furniture, considered
going to the lake more valuable. The response profiles
were significantly different between the test condition
Acquaintance and control, χ2 = 8.70,p = 0.013, as well
as Colleague and control, χ2 = 8.64,p= 0.013.
Discussion
The results indicate that a substantial portion of the
participants would decide in favor of a less valuable op-
tion when they consider the scenario we presented them
with. Simply put, the results suggest that there are situa-
tions in which many people will decide against their own
preferences. The study was not designed to investigate
which percentage of people are likely to make a decision
against their preferences. Obviously, the scenarios were
quite specific and for many the situation did not even
present them with a “difficult” choice. Thus, it is likely
that for many more people than just the recorded 31%,
there exist choices in which option x is preferred but they
still decide in favor of option y. Of course, for most de-
cisions, people’s choices will nicely align with their pre-
ferences. In fact, the control condition was specifically
designed as a base rate for decisions in which preferences
are the sole determiner of the decision in question. The
significant differences between the test condition and the
control demonstrates, however, that not all decisions are
like that. Other factors may determine which option we
are going to choose.
Before we discuss a possible explanation for the recor-
ded data, let us first address the most obvious objection
against our study. In order to counter this objection, we
then briefly present the results of a second study.
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Objection
The experiment reveals a potential decision against one’s
preferences, only if people gave all-things-considered va-
lue ratings when considering their options. It is indeed
possible that some people merely considered the positive
value of spending a day on the lake without considering
the negative value of telling one’s acquaintance or col-
league that one is not available for moving after all. If
that were the case, then it would not surprise to see de-
cisions made against one’s rated preferences.
We do not believe, however, that this is a likely possi-
bility. When we asked the participants to rate the value
of the options, we specifically named the positive as well
as the negative aspect of the choice, e.g., one of the op-
tions read: “Spending the day at the lake and tell my
colleague that I cannot come.” Moreover, the number of
participants who would decide against their own value
judgements might even be greater, because some par-
ticipants might have self-censored themselves so as to
appear to be consistent when making a decision.
However, one might insist on the ambiguity of the term
“value”, respectively, that we and the participants do not
refer to the same concept here. It is our understanding
that the concept of value can be understood in terms
of the agent’s ends and desires. “I judge that a is mo-
re valuable than b” means that I believe that a is more
valuable than b in terms of my ends and desires.7 Now
the objection that arises is that participants must have
some different concept of value in mind, because there is
not only the end of enjoying a great day at the lake but
also the end of helping other people, which is obviously
more important to them. If the objection stands, parti-
cipants do in fact decide in line with their values and do
not decide counter-preferentially. 8
The objection we raised should be taken seriously. We
7 In accordance with rational choice theory, we do not ma-
ke any proposal concerning the content of these ends.
This means that we recognize no distinction between
goals such as making a million dollar, helping other peo-
ple and being a sadist. Also note that there are no impli-
cations regarding risk-taking. The value judgement that
a is more valuable than b might be risk-neutral such as
in standard approaches or risk-averse such as in prospect
theory.
8 One way of testing the objection would be to further spe-
cify the alternatives, e.g., instead of stating one of the
options as “Spending the day at the lake and tell my
colleague that I cannot come,” we could state “Spending
the day at the lake and break my promise to my col-
league”. The reason why we opted for a different way
to tackle the objection is that “breaking a promise” or
“breaking a commitment” (we will come back to the ro-
le of commitments in the General Discussion) is a very
negative trigger. The wording “tell my colleague that I
cannot come” is relatively neutral in this regard. Howe-
ver, we agree that the empirical evidence for decisions
against preferences would be even greater if the negative
aspects of a decision would be highlighted even further.
In a follow-up study, we plan not only to investigate a
larger variety of experimental stimuli but also the impact
of the exact wording on the empirical effect.
have, therefore, conducted a second experiment where
we first explained to participants which concept of value
is involved. We will see that our results are robust, even
if we change the experimental setting in this way.
Experimental Study 2
In order to address the objection stated above, we de-
cided to rerun both test conditions (Acquaintance, Col-
league) to see whether the results would change or re-
main robust. If the objection is correct, then we should
see a substantial drop in the percentages of people who
indicate decisions that go against their preferences.
Methods
100 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical
Turk and paid a small fee for their participation. 2 par-
ticipants were excluded for not having completed the
survey. The remaining 98 participants (48 women, Mage
= 36.92, SD = 12.38) all indicated that they were native
English speakers. All participants were randomly assi-
gned to one of two conditions (Acquaintance, Colleague).
The vignettes of the two conditions were exactly the sa-
me as the vignettes of the test conditions in Experiment
1 with one exception: after participants had given their
consent to this study, they were informed about the task
ahead in the following manner.
Instructions On the next screen we will ask you to
value certain events. Before you do so, please consider
the following example: Imagine you have to value a one
week trip to Europe. On the positive side there might be
aspects like relaxing, eating new and exciting food, being
able to tell your friends of an amazing trip when you are
back, etc. On the negative side there might be aspects
like being jetlagged, longing for your loved ones at home,
missing an important meeting at work, etc. Thus, if you
value an option or an event, you take into account all its
positive and negative aspects and then make an overall
judgement.
After these instructions, participants rated both op-
tions (see Experiment 1 above), and then answered the
decision question (see also Experiment 1 above).
Results
In the Acquaintance condition, 36.6% of the participants
who decided in favor of helping to move furniture consi-
dered going to the lake more valuable. In the Colleague
condition, 26.3% of the participants who decided in fa-
vor of helping to move furniture considered going to the
lake more valuable. The results of people’s responses are
summarized in Figure 2 below.
Discussion
The data we received in Experiment 2 are highly similar
to those we collected in Experiment 1. While the percen-
tage of people who decided against their preference in the
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Figure 2 Responses in % to the two conditions. Dark grey depicts
the percentage of participants who would decide in line with their
preferences. Light grey represents the percentage of participants who
would decide against their preferences. A few participants (medium
grey) indicated an equal preference for both options.
Acquaintance condition rose from 31.4% to 36.6%, the
percentages in the Colleague condition decreased from
31.3% to 26.3%. Thus, overall the results of Experiment
1 were very robust. It seems therefore very likely, that
the participants in Experiment 1 entertained a notion of
value not only similar to the one in Experiment 2, but
also of the right kind.
General Discussion
The studies suggest that people often make decisions
in favor of options they consider less valuable.9 If our
results are correct, there are crucial implications for
both the discussion on akrasia and the debate on ratio-
nal choice, respectively, the connection between rational
choice and deontic constraints.
First, let us briefly mention the implication for akrasia.
Importantly, some philosophers mention that akrasia can
also be strong-willed (e.g., see Holton 1999; Yao 2017).
However, as far as we know, (i) nobody thus far has in-
terpreted such cases as actions out of commitment, (ii)
there is currently no empirical evidence for such cases,
and, (iii) other cases of strong-willed akrasia are rela-
ted to violations of resolutions and preference change. In
contrast, our example illustrates a case in which no such
additional machinery is necessary.
Second, our results are crucial for rational choice and
the debate on commitments. Most rational choice theo-
rists are likely to consider counter-preferential decisions
as unreasonable or irrational, similar to typical weak-
willed decisions. However, while people in weak-willed
decisions usually act out of lower desires, we have des-
9 One might object that there is a gap between the parti-
cipants rated preferences and their real decisions or real
behavior. Put differently, participants are not actually
making a decision but provide inconsequential respon-
ses after reading abstract descriptions of some options.
However, while some studies have shown an inconsisten-
cy between people’s rated preferences and real behavi-
or, a variety of empirical studies have also shown high
consistency between people’s ratings and their behavior.
Importantly, we are not aware of any empirical or theo-
retical arguments why people systematically deviate in
our respective context.
cribed a case in which people seem to be rather strong-
willed when acting against their most valued option.
Does this difference allow us to frame such decisions
as reasonable? This largely depends on what ultimately
motivates people to decide against preferences in strong-
willed decisions. A possible explanation of such decisions
takes into account the importance of commitments. Af-
ter all, many people are likely to decide to help their
acquaintance or colleague move furniture because they
have committed themselves to do so, not because they
like moving furniture. However, shouldn’t these commit-
ments be reflected in peoples’ evaluations of the two al-
ternatives? According to Sen (1977) this need not be the
case.
Sen distinguishes three kinds of motivations: narrow
self-interest, sympathy, and commitment. Both, narrow
self-interest as well as sympathy, directly affect a per-
son’s own welfare and should be reflected in people’s va-
lue judgements. In contrast, Sen (1977, p. 326) characte-
rizes commitments as altruistic attitudes towards others.
Accordingly, a person who acts out of commitment choo-
ses an option that she considers the right thing to do,
even if that option is less preferable than an alternative.
Sen admits that within the framework of rational choice
theory, there is no place for a notion like commitment
because it does not lead to any difference in terms of
one’s expected advantage.10 Speaking purely in terms of
rational choice theory, decisions against preferences, are
therefore irrational. That said, Sen’s theoretical work on
commitments has caused a lot of attention, because it
seems that people who act out of commitment, are irra-
tional only in the skewed notion of rational choice theory.
At least, intuitively, it seems that people who act against
their preferences but in favor of an option they consider
the right thing to do, are reasonable agents.
Given the importance of Sen’s contribution, some phi-
losophers have started to question Sen’s depiction of
commitments as factors that may have a motivating
force beyond expected advantage. Contra Sen, Haus-
man (2007) agues that we need to distinguish among
the variety of factors responsible for agents’ preferences,
rather than distinguish between preferences and com-
mitments. According to his view, commitments are not
counter-preferential but rather influence all-things con-
sidered judgements. Thus, while Sen believes commit-
ments can directly determine our choices, Hausman ar-
gues that they do so only via preferences. As far as we
know, the role of commitments in the decision making
process has not yet been empirically investigated.11 And
10 It is important to keep in mind here that Sen distin-
guishes different notions of preferences. The two most
important ones are (i) preference as (revealed) choice
ranking and (ii) preference as expected advantage ran-
king.
11 Note that we do not claim that there’s no empirical re-
search on commitments. See, e.g., Székely & Michael
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therefore, we do not yet know whether Sen or Hausman
are right. However, our experiment may provide a first
step to settle this debate. According to our results, it
seems that commitments may sometimes influence our
choices directly and not via preferences. At a minimum,
opponents of Sen would need to explain why some peo-
ple decide to move furniture, even if the other option is
considered better, all-things-considered.
Before we conclude, let us briefly mention one other
account that could be drawn upon to explain our data.
Heath (2008) argues that theories of rational choice can
be modified in order to incorporate rule following be-
havior. His model distinguishes between one’s desire for
an outcome (its expected utility) and how appropriate
the outcome is (the normative appropriateness of that
outcome). The basic idea is that an agent’s utility func-
tion combines two things: Getting the best outcome and
doing the right thing. According to Heath’s approach,
participants would distinguish two stages. First, they
would rank permissible actions as more or less appro-
priate. Second, they would add these values to the ex-
pected utilities. It would take more experiments to find
out whether participants indeed proceed in the way sug-
gested by Heath. In any case, Sen’s account provides a
straightforward explanation of our data.
Conclusion
In closing, let us summarize what we have done. Adhe-
rents of rational choice theory assume that agents choo-
se the option they consider best. In this paper, we ha-
ve discussed a case that violates this basic assumption.
Crucially, we have not merely relied on our own intui-
tions of whether such a case is real, but conducted two
studies, the results of which strongly suggest that ma-
ny people make decisions against their preferences. Some
might argue that this case is just one out of many sho-
wing rational choice theory to be mistaken. In particular,
weak-willed decisions have been largely accepted to be
real-world cases in which agents act contrary to their
best judgements. However, weak-willed decisions can be
distinguished from our case study in two important re-
spects: First, while in weak-willed decisions, people act
out of their lower desires, our case shows that people can
decide against their preferences by being strong-willed.
Second, at least according to Sen’s account, there are
good reasons to believe, agents may act against their pre-
ferences but at the same time make a reasonable choice.
Our results provide evidence that Sen is right, respec-
tively, that commitments can be counter-preferential.
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